Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Political Science Faculty Research and
Publications

Political Science, Department of

4-6-2020

Trump’s Fight Over Covid-19 Numbers Shows How the Hollowing
Out of Expertise Can Be Dangerous for American Democracy
Philip B. Rocco

Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/polisci_fac
Part of the Political Science Commons

Marquette University

e-Publications@Marquette
Political Science Faculty Research and Publications/College of Arts and
Sciences
This paper is NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION.
Access the published version via the link in the citation below.
USApp : American Politics and Policy Blog, (April 6, 2020). Website. This article is © LSE (London School
of Economics) US Centre and permission has been granted for this version to appear in ePublications@Marquette. LSE (London School of Economics) US Centre does not grant permission for
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without express permission from LSE
(London School of Economics) US Centre.

Trump’s Fight Over COVID-19 Numbers
Shows How the Hollowing Out of Expertise
Can Be Dangerous for American Democracy.
As in any emergency or disaster, institutional agreement over the statistics of the Covid-19 pandemic is
incredibly important. During the crisis, President Trump has questioned federally requested research
around the spread of the pandemic and the amount of equipment needed to tackle it. Philip Rocco
writes on how Trump’s efforts to undermine a common understanding of the numbers around the crisis
can be a threat to democracy itself.

240,000. That’s the number of people the White House claims could die from Covid-19.
Where that number came from, however, no one seems to know. White House officials apparently
have refused to discuss their methodology for arriving at it. Epidemiologists, including those whose
research the Trump administration used, are also apparently mystified by the estimate.

The administration produced these projections after a week of numerical conflict on coronavirus. In an
interview on Sean Hannity’s Fox News program, President Donald Trump got into the weeds on publichealth infrastructure. Referring to an emergency request from New York, Trump said: “I don’t believe
you need 40,000 or 30,000 ventilators. You know, you go into major hospitals sometimes and they’ll
have two ventilators. Now all of a sudden they’re saying, ‘Can we order 30,000 ventilators?'”
It is at this point that observers of the Trump administration might be experiencing some deja vu. The
last four years have been defined, as I argue in a new edited volume, by conflict over the official
statistics that help to constitute political reality. Trump has called unemployment rates published by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics “totally fiction.” In 2018, he falsely suggested that “3,000 people did not
die” from two hurricanes that hit Puerto Rico.
Observers of the Trump administration have treated these rhetorical acts as the product of ignorance,
a dangerous disdain for truth, or some form of personality disorder. Yet, however alluring, these
rationalizations fail to capture broader historical developments that have led to conflict over the
numbers federal officials used to make public policy.
Because pandemics are complex and uncertain events, health officials often leverage images or
phrases to facilitate public understanding. In recent weeks, the most prominent of these devices has
been the goal of “flattening the curve” of infections, a phrase accompanied by a simple visual
representation. In practice, however, it is difficult to know whether we have reached the peak rate of
infection. Moreover, the image of a single curve conceals the subtler underlying truth: there are
multiple curves which may peak at different times in different regions. Because of the weak testing
regime in the United States, most of this movement will only be visible retrospectively.
Such uncertainty makes it imperative for governments to preserve their capacity to explain what is
happening in real time. This is precisely why epidemiologists employ models that forecast how diseases
might spread under sets of conditions. These models make a variety of assumptions about the policies
governments will enact and the way that human beings will respond to those policies. Rather than
projecting a single image of the future, their purpose is to help policymakers consider the
consequences of various actions they might take.
Yet while disease models always contain conditional predictions, the fragmented character of
knowledge production in the United States may be allowing White House officials to choose estimates
that are politically expedient. According to Deborah Birx—coordinator of the president’s coronavirus
task force––officials reviewed the work of 12 models developed by teams of researchers at universities
around the country. The team appears to have leaned most heavily, however, on the projections of
one research group at the University of Washington’s Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
(IHME). That model assumes that every state will impose stay at home orders (two have yet to do this)
until the summer. Nevertheless, Trump’s own restrictions extend only until April 30. The IHME model
also fits the curve of deaths from China to emerging death data in American cities and counties. Again,
this would assume a far more aggressive approaching to testing and treatment than the one currently
taken in the United States.
The high level of political control over public numbers is not merely an artifact of the Trump
administration. As my research shows, Trump has accelerated a pre-existing trend of hollowing out

federal research capacity across the whole of government. Even before Trump took office,
relationships between federal agencies and outside researchers for disease modeling developed on an
ad hoc basis. In 2017, a federal policy change restricted funding for public-health response within the
NIH’s Modeling Infectious Disease Agent Study Network. This environment has further strained
relations between academic modelers and public-health officials, and has prompted some to call for
the creation of a new national center for disease forecasting, which would help to further integrate
and consolidate knowledge about outbreaks like Covid-19.
Trump has not always been successful in his efforts to reduce the ability of federal statistical agencies
to analyze problems like Covid-19. Congressional patrons of scientific capacity have been essential in
preserving the integrity of statistical agencies and policy-analysis units. Nevertheless, the fragmented
and ad hoc information regime creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and ambiguity which make it
harder for government to respond crises. Crises themselves can exacerbate the problem. As a result of
Covid–19, key social and economic surveys conducted by federal agencies could be interrupted for the
first time in 50 years.
The survival of complex democracies depends in part on our ability to establish a stable, common
understanding of extreme events. In the absence of this, threats to public health can become threats
to democracy itself.
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